Measuring Marxism: The Centralization Myth

This post is part of a series attempting to quantify Marx's theory of Socialism.

Marxism is largely a method of accounting and interpreting the mechanisms of economic power. While political power is understood to play a role, it is largely considered subservient to the role of economic motion. In times of stagnation, wherein technological changes often do not correspond with expanding markets and economic power is uniquely centralized, contemporary nodes of power are entrenched, and their social relations tend to become apparent. In such times, the condition of civil society becomes increasingly apparent, with all its nuances and relations to these power structures. Gramsci notes of this phenomenon:

"when the state trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. ... Hegel's conception belongs to a period in which the spreading development of the bourgeoisie could seem limitless, so that its ethicity of universality could be asserted: all mankind will be bourgeois. But, in reality, only the social group that poses the end of  the State and its own end as the target to be achieved can create an ethical state - i.e. one which tends to put an end to the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create a technically and morally unitary social organism."¹

Glass-Steagall: Dead for 2 Decades and Counting

Where the Wealthy Meet to Engineer Crises

Clinton's 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall was hardly a repeal at all. In fact, it was just the dying breath of legislation that had been steadily eroded for decades. Following Alan Greenspan's pivotal moves for deregulation, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act merely confirmed in official canon what had been increasingly evident for the past 2 decades.

In 1996, Greenspan gave the Federal Reserve Board the green light to change the practices governing commercial bank holding companies. Under Glass-Steagall, they could only invest up to 5% in investment banks (due to the added risk). Greenspan quickly doubled this limit twice: first to 10%, and then to 25%. 8 months later, another decision opened the doors to insurance underwriting, allowing Traver's (under the management of Sandy Weill, who had already unsuccessfully tried to acquire JP Morgan) to acquire Solomon Brothers. Less than a year later, Traveler's merged with Citicorp.¹


Enter the beast: a bank which merged securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and commercial banking - precisely the amalgamation which ushered in the banking instability of the early 1900s - only this time, the publicians had a new motto: too big to fail. Perhaps more ominous is the name itself though: Citicorp, now Citigroup Inc., was once known as National City Bank, variously administered by James Stillman (who managed the bank in his retirement via discrete courier), Charles E Mitchell (touted in 1933: "Mitchell more than any 50 men is responsible for this stock crash" -Carter Glass).² Mitchell was also on the board of directors for American IG Farben³ (a pharmaceuticals combine which produced Zyclon B for the Nazis), which cartelized with Standard Oil New Jersey with the help of a 30 Million bond from National City Bank.^2,4

The Credit Crisis as a Valorization Problem

Naked Capitalism has a great guest post today which exposes the incentivization process at work in the credit system:

"One source of credit market friction arises from coordination failures among lenders (see for example Gorton and He 2008). In these models, banks are heterogeneous and their behaviour strategic. The individually rational actions of heterogeneous lenders can generate collectively sub-optimal credit provision in both the upswing (a credit boom) and the downswing (a credit crunch). This is a collective action, or co-ordination, problem among banks.

...

"In the face of stiffening competition, banks were increasingly required to keep pace with the returns on equity offered by their rivals – a case not so much of “keeping up with the Joneses” as “keeping up with the Goldmans”."

So we see that the underlying cause of the expansion of credit is the valorization of capital. Not only the simple valorization, but the competition for capital (which I hope to cover soon on its own right) serves as an important ossifying process for companies which cannot necessarily sustain this model: