Patent Trolling: Just Another Form of Capitalism

The dawn of the information age has ushered in a new form of value in intellectual property. Patents are based upon the innovative character of new kinds of tools, business models and processes with economic value. And like all economic functions, the patent occurs in, and helps to propagate, a specific social relationship of value.

Enter the "patent troll:" an irreverent term referring to those who deal in the purchase and defense of patent rights. Patent trolls purchase troves of patents, then litigate to turn a profit on their purchase. Sometimes, the patent merchants get a cut of the proceeds from litigation executed by their customers. All this is justified as defense of intellectual property and encouragement of innovation. But this is actually a simple form of capitalism.

The Wage Rate and Globalization

VoxEU on the Euro and competition for capital:

"This analysis leads to the conclusion that if the underlying problem of Europe’s periphery were lack of competitiveness, it should relate to the types of products they export (vis-à-vis Germany) and not to the fact that their labour is expensive (their wage rates are substantially lower), or that labour productivity has not increased (it has significantly). The problem is that they are stuck in the manufacturing goods also produced by many other countries, especially the low-wage countries. Reducing wages would not solve the problem. What would an across-the-board reduction in nominal wages of 20%–30% achieve? The most obvious effect would be a very significant compression of demand. But would this measure restore competitiveness? We argue that it would not allow many firms to compete with German firms, which export a different basket, and in all likelihood it will not be enough to be able to compete with China’s wages." -VoxEU

This is more confirmation of the point that competition for capital along varying economies transfers market shares to economies which demand less labor compensation. This same process depresses the average for this and other standards across the board.

HT: Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism

Obama's Graft and the Woeful State of Consumer Arbitration

I've occasionally cited industrial investment in party politics as the primary motivator in party competition (a point I've largely refined from my reading of Thomas Ferguson: Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition...). Yves Smith agrees - its donations that manage the presidential policy positions:

"Obama needs to raise an estimated $1 billion to win the 2012 election. He’s moved further and further to the right over the course of his Presidency. Why is he going to change gears and alienate one of his biggest donor groups by appointing Warren?"

Also, Yves points out to these startling statistics on the bias of consumer arbitration:

"An example we cited a few days ago, that of the settlement reached between the Minnesota attorney general and the National Arbitration Forum, illustrates this point. The [NAF] was so successful in stacking the deck on mandatory arbitrations in favor of its clients, big busineses, via the roster of arbitrators it chose that consumers won in only 4% of the cases." Yves Smith: Why Liberals Are Lame (Part 2)

The Credit Crisis as a Valorization Problem

Naked Capitalism has a great guest post today which exposes the incentivization process at work in the credit system:

"One source of credit market friction arises from coordination failures among lenders (see for example Gorton and He 2008). In these models, banks are heterogeneous and their behaviour strategic. The individually rational actions of heterogeneous lenders can generate collectively sub-optimal credit provision in both the upswing (a credit boom) and the downswing (a credit crunch). This is a collective action, or co-ordination, problem among banks.

...

"In the face of stiffening competition, banks were increasingly required to keep pace with the returns on equity offered by their rivals – a case not so much of “keeping up with the Joneses” as “keeping up with the Goldmans”."

So we see that the underlying cause of the expansion of credit is the valorization of capital. Not only the simple valorization, but the competition for capital (which I hope to cover soon on its own right) serves as an important ossifying process for companies which cannot necessarily sustain this model: